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Scaffolded or Freestanding Judgements
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How reliable are intuitive or introspective judgments? This question has produced
lively debates in two respective discussions. In this commentary I will try to show
that the two phenomena of introspective and intuitive judgments are very closely
related, so that the two separate philosophical debates about them can substan-
tially inform each other. In particular, the intuition debate can profit from concep-
tual tools that have already been introduced to discussions about the reliability of
introspection.  Especially  the  distinction  between  scaffolded  and  freestanding
judgements, which has been developed by Tim Bayne & Maja Spener (2010), can
be used to more carefully investigate intuitions with respect to their epistemic re-
liability. After briefly applying this framework to some paradigm cases of “philo-
sophically interesting” intuitions, I will come to the conclusion that most of these
must be regarded as freestanding judgments and thus cannot play the role of reli-
able sources of evidence that they are supposed to play in some discussions in
contemporary epistemology and methodology.
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What is  the  evidential  status  of  introspective
mental states? Can they be used as a source of
knowledge  like  other  classical  candidates,  e.g.
experimental data, induction, or visual percep-
tion? Over the last few decades these questions
have been addressed in philosophy of mind and
epistemology in  particular.1 While  on the one
1 In fact,  Eric Schwitzgebel (2008) points out that there is a new
trend of relying on introspection, even though this method itself
is not new and its disadvantages were pointed out with the fail -
ure of introspective psychology at the beginning of the 20 th cen-
tury (c.f. Lyons 1986).
hand optimists consider the wide-ranging use of
introspection  in  philosophical  debates  unprob-
lematic, pessimists on the other hand are very
skeptical  about the same subject  matter.  But
how far can their skepticism go? Is it really the
case  that  introspective  insights  are  not  only
sometimes  misleading,  but  generally  false?
These  are  the  questions  underpinning  Tim
Bayne’s article “Introspective Insecurity”. Here
Bayne argues that a total dismissal of introspec-
tion  as  a  tool  for  gaining  information  about
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one’s  own conscious  states  (global  pessimism)
would not only be tremendously hard to ima-
gine,  but  is  also  not  warranted  by  the  argu-
ments raised in favour of that position. What
these  pessimistic  arguments  show,  however,  is
that not all kinds of introspection can be used
without  thorough  examination  of  their  truth-
tracking capacities. The resulting milder form of
skepticism is what Bayne calls local pessimism.
This distinction is what I consider Bayne’s most
important contribution to the introspection de-
bate, because it helps to avoid an overhasty dis-
missal of a source of information that is used
widely, not only in theorizing, but also in every-
day  life.  He  points  out  that  what  the  global
skeptic is missing is the idea that there are dif-
ferent kinds of  introspective judgments,  where
not  all  are  equally  insecure.  To  distinguish
between more secure cases of introspection and
less secure ones, Bayne emphasizes a distinction
introduced  by  him  and  his  colleague  Maja
Spener  in  their  paper  Introspective Humility
(2010), namely that of scaffolded versus freest-
anding judgments. While scaffolded judgments
about one’s introspective states are quite reli-
able, because their contents match closely with
the contents of the non-introspective processes
at  work  (e.g.,  visual  experience),  freestanding
judgments  lack  this  sort  of  reliability  due  to
their  abstract character.  Simply put,  the con-
tents of  freestanding judgments lack the close
connection to what one wants to find out about
the world or one’s own mental states. 
Another  prominent,  but  also  controversial
candidate for being an epstemically useful source
of evidence is intuition. Much like in the case of
introspection, there is a large debate about the
reliability  and usefulness  of  intuitions  in  philo-
sophical theorizing. This debate not only concerns
epistemology and philosophy of  mind,  but also
methodology, since many people claim that what
philosophy does at its core is conceptual work on
the basis of our rational (or conceptual) intuitions
(Bealer 1997;  Goldman 2007).  In  the  last  few
years, however, this idea of how to do philosophy
has been harshly criticized from many different
perspectives. While proponents of the fairly new
project called experimental philosophy have tried
to investigate the reliability of intuitions by con-
ducting  survey  studies  collecting  lay  intuitions
Weinberg et al. 2008;  Knobe 2007), others have
even gone so far as to argue that we do not use
any intuitions at  all  in philosophical  theorizing
(Cappelen 2012). In any case, it is still open to
debate whether intuitions can be used as reliable
sources of evidence or not. Here I will first argue
that this debate can be substantially informed by
Bayne  and  Spener’s  idea  of  scaffolded  versus
freestanding judgments; this will be referred to as
the Scaffolded vs. Freestanding Intuitions Thesis
(SFIT). I will try to show that this is the case by
highlighting some close connections and similarit-
ies between intuitions and introspection. Second, I
will argue that in fact intuitions are often made
accessible to the debates by introspection, namely
in form of introspective insight about one’s own
private concepts.2 This will be called the Intro-
spection  of  Private  Concepts  View  (IPCV).
Thereafter I will make my third claim, namely
that many intuitions, at least those relevant in
the debates in epistemology and methodology, are
best regarded as freestanding judgments and thus
should not count as reliable sources of evidence in
philosophical debates. This third and last claim
will be what I call the Unreliable Freestanding In-
tuitions Thesis (UFIT). As in the case of intro-
spection,  a  total  dismissal  of  intuitions  is  not
(yet) warranted, but neither is their wide-ranging
use in contemporary methodology. By applying
Bayne’s framework, i.e., the distinction between
scaffolded vs. freestanding judgments, to the phe-
nomenon of intuitive judgments, I will try to use
this new conceptual tool to find a possible answer
to the question of which kinds of intuitions are
trustworthy and which should not be considered
as reliable in philosophical debates.
2 Some connections and similarities 
between intuition and introspection
If  one takes a look at the literature on intro-
spection, one can find many metaphors that are
derived from visual perception, i.e. that describe
2 While in this commentary I will only concentrate on the influence of
introspection on intuitive judgments, it is also worth noticing that
both phenomena can also influence each other in the opposite direc-
tion. One factor that makes introspective insights feel so reliable at
first glance is their intuitiveness. This would be a case in which intu-
ition influences introspection.
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the phenomenon as a sort of peering into one’s
own consciousness,3 as well as direct comparis-
ons with visual perception, i.e., stating that the
evidential status of introspection is or should be
on a par with seeing the outside world. For ex-
ample, in his depiction of the central idea be-
hind  optimism  towards  introspection,  Bayne
says that:
Roughly speaking, to regard introspection
as able to reveal the phenomenal character
of one’s conscious states is to have an op-
timistic  attitude  towards  it.  (Bayne this
collection, my italics)
Or  take  Schwitzgebel,  who,  in  his  arguments
against  the accuracy of  introspection,  assesses
the phenomenon by the standards of visual per-
ception:
Does  introspection  reveal  it  to  you  as
clearly  as  visual  observation reveals  the
presence of the text before your eyes? Can
you  discern  its  gross  and  fine  features
through introspection as easily and confid-
ently as you can, through vision, discern
the gross and fine features of nearby ex-
ternal objects? (2008, my italics)
If one compares this to intuitions, one can see
that they are treated in almost the same way.
Here, the most prominent historical root of this
equal treatment of not only intuitions and per-
ception,  but  also  intuitions  and introspection,
might be the work of John Locke, who at the
beginning of the fourth book of his Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding states  that  all
knowledge is at its core introspective and intuit-
ive and can thus be regarded as the perception
of  agreement  or  disagreement  between  two
ideas:
Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing
but the perception of connexion and agree-
ment, or disagreement and repugnancy of
any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists.
3 A further hint at the equal treatment of introspection is the Latin
origin of the term ‘introspicere‘, which can be translated as ‘to exam-
ine’ or ‘to look into’.
Where this Perception is, there is Know-
ledge, and where it is not, there, though
we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we al-
ways come short of Knowledge. (1975, p.
525, italics in the original)
But contemporary discussions concerning intu-
itions  also  suggest  a  similarity  to  perception.
Take for example this short description by Ern-
est Sosa:
Intuition  gives  us  direct  insight into  the
general and abstract. (1998; my italics)4
For George Bealer, who is maybe the most rad-
ical proponent of an intuition-based philosoph-
ical  methodology,  the  two  phenomena  are  so
closely related that he mentions them both as
equal sources of evidence in philosophical theor-
izing:
So in this terminology, the standard justi-
ficatory procedure counts as evidence, not
only  experiences,  observations,  and  testi-
mony,  but  also  intuitions.  […]  When one
has an intuition, however, often one is in-
trospectively aware that one is having that
intuition. On such an occasion, one would
then have a bit of introspective evidence as
well, namely, that one is having that intu-
ition. (1997, my italics)
This similarity in the way of speaking about the
two phenomena and their obvious entanglement
in  the  debate  about  what  counts  as  evidence5
gives us information about the explananda them-
selves.  Both intuition and introspection can be
consciously experienced by the subject that uses
them to make a judgement.6 Furthermore, they
are judged to be epistemically unproblematic, be-
cause the subject has direct access to them. 
4 Here again the Latin origin ‘intueri‘, which can be translated as ‘to
view’ or also as ‘to examine’, underlines not only the folk psycholo-
gical connection between intuition and perception but also the simil-
arity between introspection and intuition. 
5 For a general discussion of what counts, or should count as evidence,
see Williamson (2007).
6 This does not mean that one always deliberately introspects or intu-
its. This would be trivially false (Sosa 1998). What is meant is that
one can in  principle  guide one’s  attention to the relevant  mental
state if necessary. 
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A good example is a classical Gettier-style
intuition, such as “It  simply seems to me that
the person in that scenario does know that she
is getting the job” (Gettier 1963). Not only the
immediate  reaction  to  Gettier  cases,  but  also
the way in which Gettier’s conclusion (i.e. that
his thought experiments show that justified true
belief does not sufficiently describe knowledge)
were widely accepted among philosophers indic-
ates  that  intuitive  judgements  are  treated  as
unproblematic and reliable. The same holds for
introspective judgements that do not only occur
in philosophical debates but also in everyday-
life belief formation. An example of such a be-
lief  could  be expressed  by a  sentence  like:  “I
surely can’t be mistaken in believing that I am
consciously experiencing a red object in front of
me at this very moment.” In the same way as in
the case of intuitions, the results of introspec-
tion do not seem to require further questioning.
In short, the act of introspecting something and
the act of intuiting something both have a phe-
nomenal  aspect  that  makes  them appear  epi-
stemically  secure.  In  the  course  of  this  com-
mentary this aspect will be referred to as a phe-
nomenology of certainty.7 In fact, I would say
that this phenomenal aspect is the reason why
the introspection as well as the intuition debate
are as controversial as they are. Both phenom-
ena come at first glance with a seeming of epi-
stemic security (or even infallibility), and only
after close examination are some insecurities re-
vealed. This phenomenology of certainty, how-
ever, does not immediately show that intuitions
and  introspection  inform  a  subject  securely
about the truth of a matter. My introspective
judgment about the what-it-is-likeness of under-
standing a sentence in a foreign language or my
intuitive judgment about whether a person has
knowledge or not are always in need of further
justification. It would be a very hasty step to go
from the  phenomenology  of  certainty  to  full-
fledged certainty (Metzinger & Windt 2014).
7 It is important to notice that the “phenomenology of certainty” pre-
supposes a “phenomenology of knowing”. This is best regarded as the
“phenomenology of knowing that one knows”. For my purposes here
the “phenomenology of knowing”, though important, is not the inter-
esting  phenomenal  aspect of  intuitions  or  introspective  insights.  I
hold the “phenomenology of certainty” far more interesting, because
I think that it is that phenomenology that leads to the strong sense
of infallibility of intuitive, as well as introspective judgments.
So then what can the two phenomena in-
form a subject  about? The least controversial
description  of  what  introspective  states  are
would be along the lines of (Schwitzgebel’s de-
scription:
A word about ‘introspection’. I happen to
regard it as a species of attention to cur-
rently ongoing conscious experience, but I
won’t defend that view here. The project
at  hand  stands  or  falls  quite  independ-
ently. Think of introspection as you will—
as long as  it  is  the  primary method by
which we normally reach judgments about
our experience in cases of the sort I’ll de-
scribe.8 (2008)
Thus construed, introspection mainly informs a
subject about the qualitative aspects of her ex-
perience. Simply put, what we do when we in-
trospect is  to pay attention to the what-it-is-
likeness of our experience.9 This aspect of exper-
ience,  however,  is  extremely  subjective  and
private. It is (if even possible) not easy to arrive
at  scientifically  informative  generalizations10
from such subjective data.11 What is needed to
secure information of that kind is the right kind
of embeddedness in other, more secure ways of
gaining knowledge about a subject matter. Such
judgments  about  a  subject’s  experience  are
what  Bayne and Spener, at least by the way I
understand  them,  refer  to  as  scaffolded  judg-
ments  (2010;  Bayne this collection).  For  ex-
8 The cases he describes in that paper are from the same domains of
experience that Bayne discusses in his article for this volume namely
emotion, visual perception, and cognitive phenomenology.
9 Note that due to restrictions of space I will cover only, the most rel-
evant interpretation of introspection,  which can be described as a
sort of inward perception. The word “perception” here is to be read
in a metaphorical way. It is not meant to express a commitment to
something along the lines of a higher-order perception view on intro-
spection (Güzeldere 1995). Rather this inward “perception” can be
understood as kind metacognition that helps a subject to conceptual-
ize her own experiences. For a more detailed distinction between dif-
ferent kinds and qualities of introspection, see  Metzinger (2003, p.
35). 
10 Though this might not be a problem for relying on introspection in
the case of perception, it becomes more pressing when it comes to
using introspective data to inform epistemology or methodology.
11 A further methodological problem that needs to be taken into con-
sideration is the fact that when collecting data about introspective or
intuitive states one has to rely on a subject’s report about the relev-
ant mental state. This can be a possible source of contamination,
which makes an investigation of the phenomena even more difficult
(Cummins 1998).
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ample, my introspective judgment about my red
experience is not exhaustively justified by itself,
but by the close match of the content of my in-
trospective  state  and the  non-phenomenal  as-
pects of my visual observation. Only then can
introspection play an evidential role,12 and thus
contribute to knowledge about one’s own con-
scious  states.  But  what  if  there  is  no  such
match? If introspection is concerned with more
abstract  contents,  like,  for  example,  the  basic
structures  of  intentionality or thought in gen-
eral, the lack of embeddedness at least increases
the insecurity of the judgment and thus makes
it an unreliable source of knowledge. Judgments
of that kind, again following Bayne and Spen-
cer, are called freestanding judgments.
Let us now turn to intuitions.  What are
intuitions about? First of all, it is important to
say that not all kinds of intuitions are relevant
to philosophical debates. Cases of intuitive con-
trols on a smartphone, for example, are not at
the core of the debate. What is meant by philo-
sophically interesting intuitions can be most ap-
propriately  expressed  by  the  term conceptual
intuition. In short, intuitions in a philosophic-
ally  relevant  sense  are  judgments  that  are
shaped by the concepts a person has of some
subject  matter  or  phenomenon.  Usually  those
intuitions are tested by conducting thought ex-
periments  in  which  a  case  is  described  that
should (or should not) fulfil  all necessary and
sufficient conditions of a concept. Then one is
supposed to take that very concept and check if
it applies to the case (or not). This is why Alvin
Goldman also refers to philosophical intuitions
as “application intuitions” (2007). Probably the
most prominent examples of such intuition-test-
ing thought experiments are Gettier cases. Go-
ing  back  to  Edmund Gettier’s  famous  paper,
Gettier cases describe scenarios in which a per-
son appears to lack knowledge, despite the fact
that the classical  conditions for  having know-
ledge, namely, having a justified true belief, are
met (1963). But can these conceptual intuitions
in fact inform us about what knowledge is in
general,  or  do  those  cases  simply  inform  us
about our personal concepts? Findings from the
12 Even if this role is then obviously a minor one in forming a belief
about the world. 
fairly  new  field  of  experimental  philosophy,
though highly  controversial  (Cullen 2010),  in-
dicate that conceptual intuitions that have been
treated as general intuitions, like those in Get-
tier cases, are in fact highly idiosyncratic, and
thus it is still  an open question whether they
can lead to generalizations about the concept at
hand (Alexander 2012).13 In  other  words,  one
could argue that conceptual intuitions are the
reflections of a subject’s idiosyncratic history of
concept acquisition (Bieri 2007).
So intuitions—or more precisely their con-
tents—reflect upon a person’s individual, highly
subjective concepts. Just like in the case of in-
trospection (which has been shown to be very
subjective  as  well),  we  need  to  investigate
whether it is possible to move from those per-
sonal  concepts  to  general  claims  about  their
contents in a reliable way. 
I take all of the above-mentioned similarit-
ies  between  introspection  and  intuition  to  be
sufficient for investigating the reliability of intu-
itions  with conceptual  tools  and insights  that
have already been introduced and established to
the  introspection  debate.  Thus,  I  will  in  the
next  section try to clarify what counts as  an
epistemically reliable intuition by applying the
distinction between scaffolded and freestanding
judgments from the introspection debate to in-
tuitions. In other words, I will investigate intu-
itions  as  scaffolded  vs.  freestanding  intuitions
(SFIT).
SFIT =Df Due to the similarities between
introspection  and intuition,  one  can also
distinguish between scaffolded and freest-
anding intuitions.
3 Philosophical intuitions as 
freestanding judgments
Before we examine whether philosophical intu-
itions  are  best  understood  as  scaffolded  or
freestanding  judgments,  it  will  be  helpful  to
13 In addition to these findings, it is also an advantage of treating intu-
itions  as  reflections  on personal  concepts,  because  such a view is
likely to be naturalized (Goldman 2007). Arguments from obscurity
or empirical implausibility of the type that have been raised against
other construals of intuition, such as Platonic insights into the laws
of nature (Brendel 2004), can thus be avoided. 
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take a closer look at how intuitions are treated
in philosophical theorizing. For this we go back
again to the paradigm case  of  intuition-based
philosophy: Gettier (1963) cases. The expected
(and  therefore  long  unchallenged)  outcome  of
those thought experiments is that the person re-
flecting on the cases admits that they describe
instances  of  justified  true  belief  that  at  the
same time fail to count as knowledge. How do
we know they’re not knowledge? We just know!
Reflecting on that answer one can come to the
conclusion that one has an intuition about the
concept of knowledge. The next question that
then needs to be answered is how a person ar-
rives  at  that  conclusion.  I  claim  that  this  is
done by introspection. As described above, in-
trospection is best understood as the act of pay-
ing attention to one’s conscious states of experi-
ence, or in other words about the phenomenal
aspects  of  experience. In the case of  an intu-
ition,  this  phenomenal  aspect  would  be  the
above-mentioned  phenomenology  of  certainty.
To summarize this, conceptual intuitions are re-
flected upon by introspecting on one’s own con-
cepts  and  their  applicability  conditions.  This
practice is what I call the Introspection of Per-
sonal Concepts View of Intuitions (IPCV).
IPCV =Df Conceptual Intuitions are made
accessible by introspecting one’s own phe-
nomenology of  certainty towards the ap-
plicability of a certain concept.
Following IPCV, this practice is then of course
vulnerable to the same skeptical challenges that
have been raised against introspection in gen-
eral. How accurately can I introspect what con-
stitutes my concept of knowledge? What about
modal aspects like the necessity of  a proposi-
tion? These questions can be made more access-
ible  by  thinking  about  intuitions  in  terms  of
scaffolded or freestanding judgments.
Again  taking  the  Gettier  intuition  about
knowledge, what makes this intuition, even though
not universal, so astonishingly stable among West-
ern philosophers? I argue that this is due to the
close match between the content of the intuition
(i.e. “She doesn’t know!”) and the rules that one
learns about how to successfully use the concept of
knowledge in our cultural niche (i.e.: “Only ascribe
knowledge if a person is justified in the right way to
believe a proposition!”).14 So in the context of West-
ern philosophy, the intuitive judgment can be re-
garded as a scaffolded and thus reliable judgment.
It is reliable because it is embedded in our conven-
tional, everyday use of the word “knowledge”.15 But
what about knowledge in general, i.e., outside the
context of Western culture? In that case, the con-
tent of the intuition, due to its personal character,
would not match the context-free, abstract use of
the concept of knowledge. The judgment would be
a  freestanding  judgment  and  thus  an  unreliable
source of evidence for making general claims about
knowledge. This would perfectly fit the idea of intu-
itions as individually-acquired concepts and also ex-
plain findings from experimental philosophy, which
indicate that intuitions are highly variable among
different cultures (Weinberg et al. 2008). One could
now argue that, even if I am correct about concep-
tual intuitions like those in Gettier cases, there are
basic intuitions that are reliable. A candidate for
such an intuition is presented by Bealer in the form
of rational intuitions:
By contrast, when we have a rational intu-
ition—say,  if  P  then  not  not  P—it
presents  itself  as  necessary:  it  does  not
seem to us that things could be otherwise;
it must be that if P then not not P. (I am
unsure  how  exactly  to  analyze  what  is
meant by saying that a rational intuition
presents itself as necessary. Perhaps some-
thing like this: necessarily, if x intuits that
P, it seems to x that P and also that ne-
cessarily P […].) (1997) 
The reliability of such a basic intuition can also
be accommodated in the terminology of scaffol-
ded  and  freestanding  judgments.  Due  to  the
close match between our intuition and the way
14 Surely this is a very simplified and rough description of concept acquisi-
tion. Further details should be empirically investigated, but due to lim-
ited space, and for and the purposes of my argument, this must suffice. 
15 The scaffold here would be the proper use of a word or concept in its
respective culture or context. Further, notice that it is also possible
to have several types of scaffolding at the same time, like conceptual
expertise (i.e. cases in which a person has a significant amount of
background knowledge about special concept) plus the above-men-
tioned cultural scaffolding. For a defence of conceptual expertise, see
Williamson (2011).
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in which we learned to describe the world, in
which it never is the case that p while simultan-
eously not p, we can regard that intuition as a
scaffolded  judgment.  Concerning  the  intuition
about  the  necessity  of  this  intuited  content,
however,  the  personal  character  of  intuitions
again  does  not  warrant  the  generalization.
Statements about the modal status of the claim
are perhaps secured by correctly applying the
laws of logic (like in the above mention example
of the principle of contradiction), but not by my
personal intuition (Alexander 2012; Pust 2014).
But even if this is true and thus if such basic in-
tuitions are always reliable, it still needs to be
shown by general optimists, concerning the reli-
ability of intuitions, how this extends to more
complex phenomena like those often discussed
in the intuition debate (Cappelen 2012). I take
the  above-discussed  cases  of  Gettier-intuitions
and Bealer’s rational intuitions as evidence that
we should at least doubt that most intuitions
that are taken as reliable sources of evidence are
sufficiently  scaffolded.  Until  this  is  shown  I
would advise that we stay skeptical and regard
those intuitions as Unreliable Freestanding Intu-
itions (UFIT).
UFIT =Df Many intuitions that are treated
as  reliable  sources  of  evidence  in  philo-
sophical theorizing lack the right scaffold-
ing and must thus be regarded as freest-
anding intuitions, which makes them epi-
stemically unreliable.
4 Conclusion
In this commentary I have tried to show that
the connections between introspection and intu-
itions are so profound that the debates about
the two phenomena can inform each other sub-
stantially, and in particular how ideas from the
introspection  debate  can  help  to  clarify  open
questions in the intuition debate (SFIT). I have
taken  the  idea  of  scaffolded  and  freestanding
judgments  from the  introspection  debate  and
applied it to that about intuitions. In so doing,
I have tried to show that the wide-ranging skep-
ticism about  introspection  also  concerns  intu-
itions, since many intuitions are investigated by
introspecting  on  one’s  phenomenology  of  cer-
tainty that typically accompanies intuitions, as
well as introspection itself (IPCV). Bayne’s in-
troduction of the scaffolded versus freestanding
judgments idea suggests that a global pessimism
towards introspection is not warranted by the
arguments that are raised by proponents of such
a position. I hope to have shown that the same
is true in the case of intuitions, which can also
be  reliable  if  they are embedded in the right
context, or if concerning the basic structures of
our experience. The question for further discus-
sion has now become how big the scope of both
scaffolded introspective and scaffolded intuitive
judgments actually is. Is it possible to develop
clear-cut  criteria  for  when  a  content  is  suffi-
ciently scaffolded? Must one draw further dis-
tinctions  and  introduce  different  kinds,  or  at
least a gradual concept, of scaffolding? So far,
applied to often very abstract epistemic targets
in philosophy, my predictions for the scope of
scaffolded  judgments  in  the  on-going  debates
are  not  very  optimistic.  I  would  advise  that
without further argumentation for the scaffold-
ing of abstract intuitions they are best regarded
as freestanding judgments (UFIT). I agree with
Sosa when  he  says,  about  the  skeptical  chal-
lenges to intuitions: “If that sort of considera-
tion is a serious indictment of intuition, there-
fore, it seems no less serious when applied to in-
trospection  […]”  (1998).  The  only  difference
might be that I hold this to be bad news for
proponents of the widespread use of both phe-
nomena,  rather  than  a  convincing  defence  of
their general reliability.
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